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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on how organizational members in non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) can develop credible and legitimate strategic plans and positions 
out of diverse and conflicting perspectives. Using empirical data drawn from a strategic 
planning episode in an international development NGO, the study examines the process 
of ‘crafting compromises’ whereby organizational members make mutual adjustments 
and concessions to reach consensus on new strategic plans and positions. The analysis 
shows that two processes facilitate crafting compromises in strategising; being adaptive 
and responsive to critique as strategic positions are developed, and an ability to forge 
relevant connections between new strategic proposals and past strategic positions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The potential for conflicting and contradictory missions, philosophies and 
rationalities is a key feature of non-government organisations (NGOs) and a core 
challenge in their operation and management. For example, practitioners need to 
negotiate and balance between social goals and economic imperatives (Jager and Bayes, 
2010; Jeger and Lapsley, 2003; Parker, 2007a), or between service delivery projects and 
advocacy activities (Molenaers et al., 2011). This can arise because the social goals 
addressed by NGOs are subject to strong value-based conflicts, often derived from 
different conceptions of progress and development (Thomas, 1996). In this way, NGOs 
can be sites of contestation between competing ideologies and identities (Mowles, 
2010), where juggling and balancing divergent needs is a strong feature (Myers and 
Sacks, 2003; Parker, 2003). What is less clear, however, is how such juggling and 
balancing is performed and what practices make it more or less effective. That is, how 
do actors in NGOs develop credible and legitimate strategic plans and positions out of 
diverse and often conflicting perspectives?  
To study this question a single strategic episode at a large, UK-based 
international development NGO was examined using data collected from a variety of 
sources (extensive documentary evidence, an ‘on-line community’, and a formal 
evaluation). The analysis focuses on how the process of making mutual adjustments to 
reach consensus can be critical to the development of strategic plans and positions that 
are considered acceptable and legitimate; a process that is termed ‘crafting 
compromises.’ The word ‘crafting’ is used to emphasise both its processual nature (the 
‘ing’) and that it is a skillful activity engaged in by organizational members. The word 
‘compromise’ is used in a positive manner to reflect the process of making mutual 
adjustment and concessions to reach agreement, rather than its (often) pejorative 
meaning of expediently accepting lower standards than are desirable. The analysis 
indicates that two processes facilitate crafting compromises in strategising: being 
adaptive and responsive to feedback and critique as strategic plans are developed, and 
an ability to forge relevant connections between new strategic proposals and past 
strategic positions. 
This focus on crafting compromises contributes to research examining the way 
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in which strategies get taken up in particular contexts with actors engaged in political 
contestations about how to move ahead (Mowles, 2010). It indicates that approaches 
seeking to implement grand plans by aligning individual interests to overall goals are 
unfeasible, and focuses on how plans are developed in a context where the influence of 
even senior managers is limited and intentions and positions need to evolve in order to 
garner support and agreement (Mowles, 2010). This process also highlights how a 
tolerance for ambiguity and disagreement appears essential for the success of strategic 
planning efforts in NGOs (Myers and Sacks, 2003; Harris et al., 2009). A focus on 
compromise as a positive force in organisations is consistent with recent research 
emphasizing the way in which actors can cooperate despite potentially divergent values 
and the potential for tensions that arise during compromise to be productive (Denis et 
al., 2007; Chenhall et al., 2013). The study also contributes to research on the use of 
business practices by NGOs, reinforcing the argument that practices like strategic 
planning require sensitivity to the motivations and values of actors in NGOs (Jegers and 
Lapsley, 2003; Lewis, 2007). A final contribution of the study is to take a closer look at 
the ‘black box’ of the workings of NGOs (Lewis, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2007), with a 
particular focus on how strategic processes take place in these organisations (Jager and 
Bayes, 2010; Helmig et al., 2004; McCourt and Gulrajani, 2010).  
 The paper begins with a review of relevant literature on developing strategies in 
NGOs. The third section describes the methods of the study, with the fourth section 
presenting the empirical findings related to a year-long strategic planning episode at an 
international development NGO. The final section of the paper discusses the results and 
provides conclusions.  
 
DEVELOPING STRATEGIES IN NGOs 
 
In the development of strategic positions NGOs typically have to manage 
diverse views and pressures from multiple stakeholders pursuing widely divergent 
agendas (Parker, 2008). Often there are tensions over the primacy given to social versus 
economic goals (Jager and Bayes, 2010; Jeger and Lapsley, 2003; Parker, 2007a). At an 
operational level, NGOs make choices over the extent to which they engage in different 
types of activities, such as service delivery, capacity building or lobbying (Molenaers et 
 4 
al., 2011), and the need to balance and prioritise the interests of potentially competing 
stakeholders (Collier, 2008). They can deal with these potentially contradictory but co-
existing pressures, for example, by balancing commercial and service orientations 
(Parker, 2007a). As the context for NGO strategising typically involves contested 
positions, it is important to examine how, if at all, these conflicts can be addressed. 
Prior research indicates that consultation, ambiguity, and values identification 
are important in managing conflicts during the production of strategies in NGOs. For 
example, Harris et al. (2009) suggest that strategic ambiguity is important in developing 
strategic plans because it provides flexibility to adjust programmes to different issues 
and demands as they arise. The effective management of NGOs requires managers to 
improvise in uncertain, contradictory and ambiguous situations (McCourt and 
Gulrajani, 2010), and to recognise that the formulation of plans can be a way to 
demonstrate identification with and reaffirmation of core values (Denis et al., 2007). It 
can also include facilitating a process of conflict resolution and negotiating between 
interests to formulate widely acceptable goals (Thomas, 1996). 
Prior research also indicates that new strategic positions do not emerge in a 
vacuum. In particular, the development of revised strategic positions tends to be 
constrained, or at least framed, by the nature and content of prior strategic proposals, 
and thus follows a kind of path-dependency logic (Denis et al., 2007). This suggests that 
prior strategic positions can play an important role in developing revised strategic 
positions, but, importantly, such prior positions are not deterministic as organizational 
members can and do play a role in shaping their development (Denis et al., 2007). 
Planning in NGOs should be conducted through a process of consultation in 
order to foster group identity and purpose, and to build coalitions and respond to 
stakeholder demands (Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Fowler, 2002; Harris et al., 2009). 
Similarly, NGOs can require highly interactive approaches to strategising rather than 
mechanistic processes (Parker, 2003). In particular, strategy processes are likely to be 
seen as fairer where they provide employees and other stakeholders with a voice and 
opportunities for engagement (Lind and Tyler, 1988). But studies indicate that 
consultation and participation must be managed with care to ensure it does not absorb 
significant amounts of time and impede decision making by creating a participation-
paralysis (Edwards and Fowler, 2002; Wallace et al., 1997; Denis et al., 2007). Collier 
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(2008), for example, found that having a large number of boards and board members 
can impede inter-board communication over major decisions.  
 Another issue facing NGOs is the often-perceived pressure to adopt practices 
used in the business sector (Dart, 2004). This can be evident in the use of business plans 
and budgets (Parker, 2008), and the use of business language, such as ‘sales’, ‘clients’ 
and ‘business units’ (Parker, 2007a). Although there is no conclusive evidence 
regarding the efficacy of business approaches in NGOs, studies do reveal that they can 
be contested. For example, Parsons and Broadbridge (2004) report resistance to the use 
of commercial practices such as league tables because they encourage competition not 
consistent with the more cooperative ethos of NGOs. Other studies report how it can be 
difficult to retain allegiance to the aspirations of service to members and the community 
in the face of business language emphasizing profitability (Parker, 2007a; 2007b; 2008). 
Furthermore, NGOs themselves can face criticisms from external constituents when 
they are seen to grow too corporate and professionalized (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 
2006). With these insights about the development of strategies in NGOs, we now turn to 
examine how an international development NGO attempted to develop a new strategic 
position during a single strategic planning episode.  
 
METHOD 
Context 
 
 This study examines a “strategic review” undertaken between February 2009 and 
January 2010 at Voluntary Service Overseas, a UK-based international development 
NGO. VSO was founded in 1958 in England as an organization to send school leavers 
to teach English in the “underdeveloped territories of the Commonwealth” (Bird, 1998). 
Volunteers were initially recruited exclusively from England, and later from other 
countries in the ‘North’, i.e., the Netherlands and Canada. In 2000 VSO opened its first 
volunteer recruitment base in the ‘South’, with the establishment of VSO Jitolee in 
Kenya, followed by further bases in the Philippines and India. Geographic expansion 
was also accompanied by changes to the age, experience and work of volunteers. The 
18-year-old high school graduate had been replaced by a (typically) 30-year old-plus 
experienced professional. Each year approximately 1500 volunteers are recruited and 
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take up placements in one of the over forty countries in which VSO operates 
programmes, mainly in South and South-east Asia, and sub-Saharan and West Africa 
(see Chenhall, Hall & Smith, 2013; 2015 for further detail on VSO). In 2004 VSO 
signalled that it would adopt a more ‘programmatic’ approach to its work, releasing a 
new strategic plan “Focus for Change.” This plan moved away from the long-standing 
model of work centered around volunteering to one focusing VSO’s efforts on 
“achieving specific development priorities within the framework of six development 
goals” (VSO, 2004).1  
The strategic discussions at VSO about the extent of focus on development 
goals, poverty reduction, central programmes or volunteering reflected wider debates 
about the often political and contentious nature of development work. At the broadest 
level, the very idea of ‘development’ has itself been subject to much debate and critique 
(e.g., Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1994; Riddell, 2007; Lewis and Kanji, 2009). The role 
of NGOs in development efforts has been contentious, being seen as the ‘silver-bullet’ 
to solve entrenched development problems, or being seen as ‘captured’ by host 
governments (e.g., Lewis and Kanji, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2008). Further debates 
include whether NGOs should focus on challenging dominant models as an ‘alternative’ 
to mainstream development approaches, or playing an active role in service delivery 
fitting within the programmes of dominant development actors such as the World Bank 
or United Nations (Bebbington et al., 2008; Lewis and Kanji, 2009). As such, VSO’s 
discussions about its own approach to development work took place within this wider 
discourse. 
With the recent appointment of a new CEO, along with changes in the 
international development environment and the domestic political landscape in the UK, 
in early 2009 VSO embarked on a year-long ‘strategic review’ process (see Figure 1 for 
a timeline). This process reflects a strategic episode that has a beginning and an end 
whereby organizational actors discuss topics that are likely to have a long-term 
influence on the organization (Jager and Bayes, 2010). As will be elaborated below, the 
strategic review involved a variety of working groups, consultation processes, various 
meetings and strategy summits, and the use of strategy consultants from the business 
sector. The endpoint of the strategic review was the production of a new strategic plan, 
issued in 2010, which came to be called ‘People First.’2  
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<insert Figure 1 here> 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 Given the lack of research on how NGOs develop strategic positions, an inductive, 
qualitative research approach was used (e.g., Parker, 2003; 2007a; Greenspan, 2014; 
Harris, 2014; Schiller and Almog-Bar, 2013). In particular, the empirical focus on a 
single strategic episode provides rich detail to analyse the sensemaking process of 
actors and provide ‘thick’ descriptions of NGO activity (McCourt and Gulrajani, 2010; 
Jager and Bayes, 2010; Harris et al., 2009). Like Parker (2003; 2007a), the aim was to 
go beyond formal strategy pronouncements and penetrate the normally unseen and 
inaccessible processes through which actors in NGOs generate strategic proposals.  
 Data was collected from three sources. The first source is the complete set of 
strategic review documents; beginning with the Board minutes that approved the 
strategic review process to the issuance of the new strategic plan. This data comprised 
over 250 separate electronic files (word documents, emails and PowerPoint 
presentations) providing crucial information on the positions debated throughout the 
strategic review. The second source is staff commentary on the strategic review posted 
to VSO’s ‘on-line community’ (an intranet site used throughout the strategic review). 
The transcript of the on-line community totalled 308 pages of text. The third source was 
data from a ‘strategic learning review’ conducted by VSO at the end of the strategic 
review process, which included responses by staff to survey questions as well as 
qualitative feedback.  
 The study was also supported by extensive knowledge of VSO gained from both 
an external and internal perspective. The author was involved in a larger research study 
of VSO, which included being a volunteer in Sri Lanka for three months during the 
period of the strategic review (see Chenhall, Hall, and Smith, 2013; 2015). This 
experience provided extensive knowledge of VSO to provide warrants for the analytical 
judgements of the strategic review material (Alac and Hutchins, 2004). Although a 
volunteer at the time, the author did not participate in the strategic review process in any 
way, and was only provided access to the strategic review documents and on-line 
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community transcripts several months after the strategic review process had been 
completed.  
 To analyse the data I arranged it chronologically and identified common themes and 
emerging patterns. In particular, I conducted line-by-line readings of all the strategic 
review documents and transcripts from the ‘on-line community’ searching for as many 
ideas for themes and patterns as possible (Mikkelsen, 2013). This process focused on 
changes in the positions being advanced in the strategic review, and then sought to 
understand the nature of these changes, why they came about and the subsequent 
reactions from different people within the organization.  
 This original data was then re-organised around significant issues (for example, 
debates about ‘where to work’, the use of ‘business’ language) that emerged in trying to 
understand the dynamics of the strategic review process at VSO. Although the data 
analysis was sensitized by knowledge of the prior literature, the overall approach to 
developing themes reflected a “grounded theory” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) method of 
knowledge-building, where relevant literature and explanation is sought subsequent to 
data collection, rather than being used to develop initial hypotheses or propositions 
(Harris, 2014; Morrison and Salipante, 2007). As such, once the concept of ‘crafting 
compromises’ and the underlying processes were identified as being significant, I then 
re-examined the data with specific reference to these processes (c.f., Greenspan, 2014; 
Harris, 2014). As part of this process, emerging findings from the study were compared 
with existing research to identify the extent of matching between the data and 
expectations based on prior theory. In particular, findings that did not appear to fit 
emerging patterns and/or existing research were highlighted for further investigation as 
the research progressed. This process was iterative throughout the research, and finished 
when it was believed that a plausible fit between research questions, theory and data had 
been achieved. In particular, this involved reaching a ‘saturation point’ where additional 
empirical examples and illustrations reinforced the prior themes without providing any 
new categories or issues requiring explanation (Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006).  
The central issue that (re)emerged during the strategic review concerning the 
content of the strategic proposals (Denis et al., 2007) was debate about where and how 
VSO should work. In addition, two complicating dynamics emerged regarding the 
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processes through which the strategic proposals were introduced and debated (Denis et 
al, 2007): (1) the role and extent of staff and volunteer participation, and (2) the 
influence of business. Whilst these themes emerged from the data, the issues they 
address are likely to reflect common dilemmas in NGO strategising, that is, where and 
how to operate, whom to involve, and the importance of language. Addressing these 
themes also allows consideration of the value-implications of both the content of 
strategic proposals (e.g., where to work), and the processes through which such 
proposals are formulated (e.g., participation and language) (Denis et al, 2007). The next 
section addresses each of these issues in turn. 
 
CRAFTING COMPROMISES IN THE STRATEGIC REVIEW PROCESS 
 
Where to work 
 
 Debate about where to work had a long history at VSO, in effect existing since 
its founding in the 1950s. Historically, VSO had structured its work primarily around 
the ‘country programme’, each with its own volunteers, staff and budget 
responsibilities. Therefore, decisions about where to work were primarily decisions 
about which countries VSO should work in. Working Group 3, tasked with analysing 
this problem, outlined what they saw as VSO’s typical approach: 
 
Choices about which countries we work in have been made largely on historical and 
pragmatic grounds…Focus for Change did not explicitly guide where we work…We don’t 
make decisions about the size of programmes in countries based on a global, systematic 
assessment (Working Group 3, Pink Paper).  
 
This quote reveals a desire to move away from the reliance on ‘historic and pragmatic 
grounds’ and to move toward a more ‘systematic assessment.’ Importantly, the prior 
strategic plan (Focus for Change) is singled out for not providing explicit guidance on 
this issue, therefore framing the context in which the new strategic plan would need to 
provide such guidance in order to be considered appropriate. The perceived lack of 
systematic assessment was not just an internal management concern but also viewed as 
a challenge to VSO’s legitimacy in the sector, with a country director commenting that 
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his replies to questions about why VSO works in particular countries “were and still are, 
insufficient and not satisfactory.” These comments indicate an environment where the 
current strategic review was expected to provide, if not definitive ‘answers’, then at 
least some more explicit guidance on where VSO should work and why.  
 A central dilemma emerging at the ‘white paper’ stage was whether VSO should 
“focus around a set of programme priorities” or focus on “reaching and impacting the 
lives of the highest possible number of beneficiaries?”3 The reference to programme 
priorities reflects Focus for Change, where VSO’s work was directed towards six 
programme areas. However, it was generally felt that this focus limited opportunities for 
programmes to reach new beneficiaries outside the six programme areas. The nature of 
this dilemma illustrates how the prior strategic position plays a strong role in framing 
debate about the new strategic position.  
There was a further dilemma around whether VSO should choose its country 
operations based on the number of poor people rather than the overall level of 
development of particular countries (e.g., ranking on the Human Development Index). 
One option that surfaced during the white Paper stage was to “focus all of our country 
programming on India, China and Nigeria where more than 60% of the world’s poorest 
people live.”4 This proposal invited much debate as the strategic review progressed. It 
was thought to require a very different approach to operations in country programmes. 
In providing feedback on the white papers, the Kenyan country programme (echoing the 
view of many country programmes) outlined its perspective on the implications of such 
an approach:  
 
VSO would need to start offering services, and providing funding for programmes...VSO 
would have to be radical in its approach and facilitate capacity building of communities as 
well as their institutions in needy areas where no such exist...VSO would also need to define 
its work geographically instead of spreading thin and probably move staff closer to the areas 
where action is taking place. 
 
As noted, this model would require, in effect, a wholesale change to VSO’s current 
mode of operations. Concerns were raised about its feasibility, with the Malawi 
programme stating that it was “unrealistic and not possible” because VSO was not 
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equipped to reach the poorest of the poor who are often marginalised and invisible in 
village life.  
There was also recognition that this approach would encounter difficulties with 
donors: 
 
VSO would need to clearly understand and be able to communicate the rationale for 
concentrating resources in countries like China and India just as donors are focusing their 
development aid elsewhere in less wealthy countries that are not seen as “emerging 
economies” (Working Group 3, Pink Paper).   
 
VSO’s main donor, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), had 
started to shift toward a “focus on the poorest countries” whereby they would “narrow 
our country coverage, to focus our efforts where [DFID] can have the biggest possible 
impact on poverty reduction.”5 Here, VSO’s proposal to choose countries based on the 
greatest number of poor people, which would necessarily include a strong focus on 
China, runs counter to the logic of donors whose focus is on the relative development of 
countries as a whole. This situation is characteristic of the potential for an agenda 
conflict between the stakeholders of NGOs (e.g., Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). At a 
time when donors were rationalising resources to focus on those countries considered to 
be the poorest, a movement away from these countries by VSO could clearly prove 
problematic. However, a strong desire remained within VSO to maintain a focus on 
countries like India and China.  
Resolving these different positions was challenging and represented a critical 
incident during the course of the strategic view whereby proposals were further refined. 
Specifically, a compromise position emerged during the Pink Paper stage that sought to 
combine a focus on poor countries with a focus on the greatest number of poor people. 
This position came to be termed a ‘global vision’, which proposed that: 
 
instead of focusing all of our resources on the countries in the lowest third of the HDI (as we 
currently aim to), we take a global approach; working not only in the least developed 
countries but also fighting global poverty through a people to people approach in lower 
middle income countries, globally influential countries and some developed countries 
(Working Group 3, Pink Paper). 
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The global vision created a typology whereby VSO could work in different 
countries in different ways. Programming would continue in the least developed 
countries, incorporating positions advocating for this approach to remain a central 
focus for VSO. But VSO would also work in what is called a ‘people to people’ 
approach in globally influential countries (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India and China), 
incorporating positions advocating a focus on the greatest number of poor people. 
The rationale for the ‘global vision’ approach coalesced during the Blue Paper 
stage:  
 
VSO will continue to focus its work and resources in the poorest and least developed 
countries in the world, seeking to work further down the HDI/HPI/GDI index.  However, with 
a huge proportion of poorest people in the world living outside this typology, VSO will work 
differently and cost effectively in more developed countries (Blue Paper 1).  
 
This quote shows how actors were responsive to feedback and sought to combine the 
different perspectives using the country typology. The typology is seen to provide 
clarity about why and how VSO will work in different countries, addressing concerns 
about the lack of a systematic assessment. There is also recognition of the importance of 
being able to clearly communicate the approach, which can help to provide explanations 
to outsiders that question VSO’s operations, and overcome a perceived deficiency in the 
guidance provided by the prior strategic plan. The inclusion in the typology of both least 
developed countries and influential developing countries is a compromise between 
desires to work with the poorest of the poor whilst recognising donor priorities.  
Some concerns were raised, however, about the need for “more clarity around 
the objective of country classification and the value and justification behind the 
typology.”6 These concerns were addressed to some extent in the revised blue paper, 
where there was clarification of the way in which VSO would operate. For example, 
work in fragile states would “re-state the value of volunteers working in a service 
delivery role”, work in fast-growing economies would focus on supporting “social 
movements, agents of change and policy development” and work in developed 
countries would focus on “public engagement and advocacy.” 7 This is further evidence 
of being responsive and adaptive to criticism through the refinement of the strategic 
plan.  
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The response to the typology was generally positive, with reference groups 
commenting that it “made a lot of sense”, and that it was important to move away from 
a “one size fits all” approach.8 The ‘global vision’ approach was thus included as a 
central pillar of the new strategic position outlined by VSO in its ‘People First’ strategic 
document.  
 
Participation 
 
Participation was also a critical issue for the legitimacy of the strategic review, 
particularly as it (and associated concepts of empowerment and inclusion) was a core 
value at VSO reflected in the prior strategic plan. It was also viewed as important in the 
wider international NGO context (Lewis, 2007; Lewis and Kanji, 2009; Cooke; 2008). 
The importance of participation was formalised in the first key document issued during 
the strategic review, the ‘mobilisation document’. It stated: 
 
The process will be participative and have a dispersed “heart” i.e. no one stakeholder group 
should be able to claim ownership of, or overly influence, the key outcomes at each stage of 
the process. It will need broad ranging and deep participation from all of the major parts of 
VSO (Moblisation document, June 2009, emphasis in original). 
 
This statement was reflected in the formal involvement of over 300 staff in the strategic 
review process (reflecting over a third of all VSO staff at the time). The practice of 
engaging a relatively high proportion of staff and providing many opportunities for 
input was reflected positively in the strategic learning review, which stated that ‘the 
general feeling was the process was extremely participatory.’ In contrast, it was 
practices that had the potential to create a sense of ‘exclusion’ that proved problematic.  
The first practice that generated a sense of exclusion was the establishment of six 
working groups, each tasked with developing proposals for a specific ‘big question’ that 
emerged at the start of the review process. Each working group was responsible for 
developing the green, white and then pink papers that would then be integrated into the 
‘blue paper’ (see Figure 1). Each working group had a membership of 10-12 staff from 
across different constituencies in VSO. In general, it was felt that the diversity of staff 
in the working groups was appropriate and provided settings where organizational 
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members could weigh and potentially combine the views from different constituents. 
However, there were criticisms over the ‘lack of transparency’ in the formation of the 
groups, with a desire for ‘more clarity’ over who was selected and why (Strategic 
Review learning document, December 2009).  
A second practice related to the establishment of ‘reference groups’ whose 
purpose was to provide feedback to the working groups as they developed their 
proposals. The initial use of 12 reference groups was criticised for being too narrow and 
leaving some constituencies without a voice. A further 6 reference groups were 
established, after which it was felt there were reference groups for many constituencies 
within VSO, for example, for each geographic region, for each of the Federation 
Members, for issue specific groups such as ‘Gender’ and ‘Diversity’, and for other parts 
of VSO such as ‘International Recruitment’. Reference groups were formally invited to 
provide feedback to working groups at the ‘white paper’ and ‘blue paper’ stages. This 
was welcomed and represented a critical incident whereby actors were responsive and 
adaptive to criticism (by expanding the number of reference groups) and helped to 
develop more consensus around the processes used to support the strategic review.  
A third practice concerned the use of the ‘on-line community’ for staff to post 
comments on a variety of different issues (or ‘threads’) that related to each working 
group. Here, as above, concerns were raised over its exclusionary nature, with many 
posts to the on-line community expressing concern that staff without regular access to 
IT facilities (typically ‘lower-level’ staff in the programme office) were not being 
included. There was also concern that some staff would find the use of an on-line forum 
difficult as they were not used to expressing views in ‘public’ nor in writing, consistent 
with research highlighting how communication technologies can exclude the voices of 
southern partners (Verkoren, 2010; Townsend et al., 2002). Given that empowerment 
was a key value of VSO explicitly articulated in the prior strategic plan, it also 
highlights how difficulties can arise when the current process does not articulate with 
these existing values. These critiques centre on the on-line community not being 
sufficiently ‘inclusive’, particularly in respect of different cultural attitudes to public 
debate and technological barriers. Although there was general consensus that the on-line 
community was helpful, its use required more attention to issues of inclusion to be 
considered a more legitimate practice.
9
 Despite some tensions, the overall evidence 
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from the learning review was that people felt the strategic review process was 
participatory, with 82% of staff agreeing that the principle ‘The review will be 
participative’ was fully/mostly met. 
 
The influence of business 
 
 As noted above, VSO involved strategy consultants from the business sector to 
provide technical support throughout the strategic review. A consultant worked at the 
VSO head-office in London for approximately six months. A second, more senior 
consultant, provided higher-level support and visited VSO approximately every two 
weeks. This reflects the recent practice of importing expertise from the private sector to 
assist the management of development organisations (Mowles, 2010) and to appear 
more ‘business-like’ (Dart, 2004; Jegers and Lapsley, 2001; 2003; Myers and Sacks, 
2003).  
Although the involvement of the strategy consultants was considered ‘beneficial’, 
it came with the trappings of a business style that was heavily criticised throughout the 
strategic review.
10
 This created a complex challenge regarding how to combine these 
different perspectives and facilitate the involvement of the strategy consultants and 
VSO staff during the strategic review process. From the outset the use of the strategy 
consultants ‘divided opinion’, primarily related to a concern that VSO might lose 
control over the process and that it would result in the adoption of a ‘business’ 
approach.
11
 This led to the articulation of Principle 7 of the Strategic Review: 
 
VSO will own, lead and manage the Strategic Review, both in terms of process and 
outcomes...[the strategy consultants] will provide consulting support to facilitate and guide 
VSO through this process, but this will always be in combination with project managers from 
VSO to ensure the best outputs possible (Mobilisation document). 
 
This statement is a critical incident as it is an effort to be responsive to criticism by 
directly addressing concerns raised over the use of the strategy consultants, both 
through the articulation of the principle itself, and the statement that VSO will ‘own’ the 
process.  
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The first key test of the principle came with the publication of the Mobilisation 
document in the early stage of the strategic review process. One of the consultants 
worked directly on its composition alongside VSO staff, which appears consistent with 
Principle 7 outlined above. However, their involvement was accompanied by a 
particular style of language within the mobilisation document that proved particularly 
contentious and was subject to much criticism. The South-east Asia reference group 
made the following statement: 
 
They [the strategy consultants] are approaching the review from a private sector perspective 
which may not be appropriate to a review of this kind in the NGO sector where there are a 
range of beliefs, motivations, discourse and language that are unique to the NGO and 
development sectors. 
 
This critique is directed at allowing the values of the business world to infiltrate an 
NGO sector that is believed to have its own set of unique values and approaches, 
particularly where business practices are seen as being adopted wholesale (Jegers and 
Lapsley, 2003; Myers and Sacks, 2003; Parker, 2003). The highlighting of a unique 
language for NGOs became a particular concern after the drafting of the Mobilisation 
document, as the following statement from a country director reveals: 
 
The [mobilization] document is overly laden with business terminology (business models, 
competencies, ‘developing the business’). Let’s be clear that VSO is not a business and 
doesn’t—as far as I am aware—aspire to be one.12 
 
As alluded to in this statement, the mobilisation document was replete with terms such 
as ‘business plan’, the ‘business model’ and ‘managing the business’.13 This critique 
was associated with calls to ensure that the language of the NGO sector would 
‘underpin the review’ and that business language would only be used when VSO was 
sure it ‘represents the philosophy of what we are trying to express.’14 As such, at this 
early stage of the strategic review, efforts to combine a business approach with VSO 
customary values were not yet effective.  
Following the Mobilisation document, the next critical incident was the 
publication of the second VSO-wide document, the first ‘Blue paper’, issued in 
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November 2009. In the first Blue paper, there is reference to a ‘business model’, 
‘business culture’ and ‘business departments’. Statements also refer to the need for VSO 
to ‘maximise impact [and] effectiveness.’15 As such, the use of business language 
proved particularly ‘sticky’ and resistant to change, even though the strategic review 
was inclusive and involved feedback from a variety of groups. In this way, the 
persistent use of such business language did not favour the development of a durable 
compromise because it did not respect the different positions in an integrated way (c.f., 
Denis et al., 2007), thus providing an example of where actors found it difficult to adapt 
appropriately to criticism and feedback. 
The first Blue paper was distributed to reference groups for feedback and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, was again subject to a strong critique regarding its continued 
use of business language. The West Africa reference group made the following 
illustrative statement: 
 
The language used throughout the document rendered it inaccessible in parts…whereas there 
was agreement that the voluntary sector could learn much from the private sector, there was 
no need to let it influence our language. 
 
This comment shows that whilst there is openness to learning from ideas from business, 
it was essential for VSO to retain ‘our language’ and not have it influenced by a private 
sector philosophy. Moving towards a more business-like approach was of much concern 
to many people at VSO, expressed most clearly by the Southern Africa reference group 
in their comments on the first Blue paper: 
 
Why are we adopting a business culture when we are an NGO … shouldn’t the fact that we 
are an NGO with a strong philosophy of our own be influence enough rather than adopting a 
model that is looking more and more suspect in today’s global economy?   
 
This statement reflects a strong concern that VSO’s own philosophy and practices 
should be ‘influence enough’ in deciding on its strategic direction, and its approach 
should not need to be justified by reference to principles derived from the world of the 
private sector. This is followed by a critique that questions the legitimacy of the 
business sector model given the parlous state of the world economy at the time 
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(overwhelmingly thought to be the result of the actions of the private sector, particularly 
financial institutions).  
 These comments and feedback from the other reference groups on the first Blue 
paper were provided to those staff responsible for preparing the second (and final) Blue 
paper. It was here that the critiques over the use of business language gained some 
traction. The original Blue paper was ‘reviewed and refined, incorporating many of the 
reference group’s comments’.16 The revised Blue paper no longer made any references 
to a ‘business model’, ‘business culture’ or ‘business departments.’ Furthermore, where 
the term ‘business’ was used, it was in connection with practices such as IT and HR that 
were termed ‘business processes’, and, importantly, no longer in the context of what 
VSO does or its culture. Although occurring late in the process, the final Blue paper 
showed evidence of being responsive to sustained critique regarding the over-use of 
business language. Consequently, the revised Blue paper then became the final version 
of VSO’s strategic plan and was approved by VSO’s Board in January 2010. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the processes involved in a strategic planning episode at an 
international development NGO. It showed how the process at the core of crafting 
compromises is an ability to combine different perspectives by making mutual 
adjustments in ways that develop credible and ultimately acceptable strategic positions. 
This is important because strategizing can involve the need to balance and prioritise the 
potentially competing interests of different stakeholders (Collier, 2008). This process 
involved organizational members’ weighing and combining existing positions in an 
integrated way rather than seeking to influence and shape those positions directly 
(Denis et al., 2007). This is an effective approach for NGOs because actors are likely to 
have strongly held views related to different ideologies, identities and conceptions of 
development that are resistant to change. As such, taking the options put forward by 
different actors and recombining them into a consensus position helps to create 
acceptable and legitimate plans. As diverse and often conflicting perspectives typically 
characterize NGOs, the study explores how crafting compromises can help actors to 
cooperate and how the process of making mutual adjustments can be productive (Denis 
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et al., 2007; Chenhall et al., 2013). This is important in helping NGOs to develop 
credible and realistic strategic plans that chart an appropriate course between the 
extremes of inflationary consensus and lowest common denominator positions that can 
characterize strategising in pluralistic contexts (Denis et al., 2007).  
The debate over where to work exemplified the process of crafting 
compromises, where the various positions and options about where and how to work 
offered by different groups were combined into a credible and accepted form by the end 
of the strategic review. This process involved making adjustments to stated strategic 
positions in relation to issues raised from a variety of different stakeholders. This 
included constituents internal to VSO, such as existing employees and volunteers, 
individual country programmes, and working and reference groups. But it also involved 
reaction to or being cognizant of the perspectives of external constituents, such as 
funders, government, external advisors and consultants, other NGOs and the state of the 
development discourse at that time. The making of mutual adjustments in this context 
highlights the dynamic, political and negotiated aspects of the crafting process. 
The analysis indicates that two processes in particular facilitated crafting 
compromises. The first process involves being adaptive and responsive to critique from 
different groups as positions are developed. This was exemplified in the way in which 
actors were responsive to feedback during the discussions about ‘where to work’, with 
new positions and ideas emerging from working groups in response to feedback from 
reference groups and country programmes. This process is critical in enabling mutual 
adjustments and recombination of positions to take place, evident in the ‘global vision’ 
country typology in the final strategic plan that combined a focus on the greatest 
number of poor people with a focus on poor countries. The high level of participation 
that characterises planning processes in development agencies (Harris et al., 2009; 
Hopgood, 2006; Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Wallace et al., 1997) suggests that the 
overall level of adaptation and responsiveness is critical because the essence of crafting 
compromises is the collective mutual adjustment of positions. Adjustments can take the 
form of making specific changes to address criticisms, or, where practices cannot be 
adjusted, acknowledging the concern and why it could not be changed. This can help to 
integrate different perspectives by providing visibility to the values of different groups, 
which appears essential to the legitimacy of strategising processes in this setting. In this 
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way, responsiveness to critique is also important in showing that participation is more 
than a ‘sham ritual’ (Ebrahim, 2003). This provides some preliminary understanding of 
how consultation and participation can be organised to foster group identity and avoid 
paralysis (Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Edwards and Fowler, 2002), which could be 
explored more explicitly in future research.  
 The second process concerns the positioning of current strategic positions in 
relation to past strategic positions. Particularly for NGOs with a long history, past plans 
are likely to exert considerable influence over whether current plans are considered 
acceptable and legitimate. This is because current strategic plans are constrained by the 
nature of previous compromises and thus tend to follow path-dependency logics (Denis 
et al., 2007). For example, participation and empowerment were critical issues for the 
legitimacy of the strategic review at least in part because VSO’s prior strategic plan 
placed strong emphasis on these values. The study shows, however, that such path-
dependency also represents an opportunity to garner support for new strategic positions 
where they provide recognition of and a sense of continuity between past positions and 
those being developed. For example, the ‘global vision’ country typology provided 
continuity with the programmatic approach in Focus for Change but was also a reaction 
to its perceived restrictive nature. In this way, actors are constrained by their 
environments, but past strategic ideas and policies are not ‘straightjackets’ and can be 
taken up by actors and modified to suit current contexts. This echoes the way in which 
development ideas more broadly are not just adopted by development actors but 
contested and reworked in practice (Bebbington et al., 2007).  
 The study also contributes to research on the use of business practices by NGOs. 
The findings confirm arguments from prior research that the simple transference of 
business sector practices, such as formal strategic planning, to the NGO sector is not 
sensitive to the motivations and practices of actors in NGOs (Jegers and Lapsley, 2003; 
Lewis, 2007). It shows how an NGO can develop its own strategic planning processes 
that take into account the role, purpose and values of the NGO sector (Myers and Sacks, 
2003). This requires attention to not only the actual explication of the strategic direction 
(content) but also to how it is organized and the language that is used to formulate it 
(process) (c.f., Denis et al., 2007).  
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This analysis considered how the language used in the strategic review 
documents was fundamentally connected to and viewed as an expression of what VSO 
was and, critically, what it is was going to become. The critiques of a business language 
largely stressed the importance of VSO as an ‘NGO’, an organization separate from and 
different to the business sector. Importantly, those working in the third sector often 
highlight its distinctiveness (e.g., Parsons and Broadbridge, 2004; Helmig, Jegers and 
Lapsley, 2004; Hopgood, 2006). As such, largely removing the focus on business 
language in the final strategy paper was critical in creating a document that respected 
the values of different constituents in a more integrated way (c.f., Denis et al., 2007). 
Most importantly, business language was excluded from domains that were considered 
by VSO staff as reflective of the ‘NGO way’ of operating, such as VSO’s approach to 
development and its organisational culture. This reflects not a mere change in terms but 
the use (in this case, removal) of language in a way that recognized its symbolic 
importance in indicating the purpose and meaning of the organization itself. Whilst it is 
not possible to analyse whether these changes are directly connected to the success or 
otherwise of the strategy, the Board accepted them and there was sufficient consensus 
such that the document became VSO’s new strategic plan in January 2010. 
A final contribution relates to the development of greater understanding of the 
role of participation in NGO strategising. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Harris et 
al., 2009; Denis et al., 2007; Parker, 2003), participation was a critical issue in 
developing the legitimacy of the strategic review process. The analysis of participation 
at VSO, however, showed that it was not the overall level of participation that was 
contentious, but the extent to which particular practices were seen to be exclusionary 
and not empowering of particular groups. This was important in two ways. One, not 
recognizing the importance of empowering different groups would have been an 
outcome that was at odds with the values proclaimed by VSO in its prior strategic plan. 
In this way, the new strategic position would have little or no resonance with prior 
strategic positions and thus would be unlikely to be considered acceptable and 
legitimate (c.f., Denis et al., 2007). Two, being ‘inclusive’ was a key value at VSO and 
thus developing a sustainable compromise was thus dependent on accommodating such 
values appropriately.  
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An implication of this analysis is that the overall level or extent of participation 
may not be of central importance. Rather, it appears that careful attention to and 
inclusion of the voices of people from relevant stakeholder groups was most critical to 
enhancing the perceived fairness of the strategic review process (c.f., Lind and Tyler, 
1988). In addition, the use of procedural explanations was important whereby actors 
provide an explanation for why they behaved in a certain manner (Lind and Tyler, 
1988). For example, it was important for staff to explain why particular groups were 
included in the strategic review in order to show how such practices were aligned with 
values of inclusion at VSO. This points to both the practical and discursive elements of 
this process, whereby not only is the actual inclusion and exclusion of people in the 
strategising process important, but also the provision of an articulated rationale for 
choices to express the significance of inclusion as a value of the organization.  
This study is subject to some limitations. First, while it included extensive 
documentary evidence and comments from the on-line staff forum, it would have been 
helpful to observe the activities of working and reference groups as they debated and 
discussed the different strategic options (e.g., Parker, 2007a; Collier, 2008). Second, the 
study’s conclusions are oriented towards more formalised strategic processes, providing 
opportunities for future research to examine the nature of crafting compromises in more 
informal and emergent approaches to strategy formulation. Third, whilst the processes 
observed in the study are likely to be relevant for strategic episodes in other NGOs, it 
took place in a single development NGO headquartered in the UK - future research is 
needed to examine the applicability of the findings in different country contexts and 
different types of NGOs (e.g., national or regional NGOs, advocacy NGOs, etc.). Future 
research could also examine whether processes in addition to the two identified in this 
study (being adaptive and responsive to feedback, positioning current strategic positions 
in relation to past strategic positions) are important for crafting compromises in a 
strategising process, and how the process of crafting compromises in the formulation of 
strategic positions is related to how or how well particular strategic positions are 
implemented in NGOs beyond their formal acceptance.  
 Finally, the study has several implications for practice. It identifies two 
processes that strategy practitioners can pay attention to in order to help develop 
credible and ultimately acceptable strategic positions. It also provides insights regarding 
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the importance of language and participation in NGOs and how practitioners can 
manage the nuances of these issues. For example, by paying close attention to staff 
perceptions of inclusion and exclusion rather than overall levels of participation, and 
care and attention to the specific terms and words used to describe strategic positions. 
Finally, the study indicates that senior managers in NGOs should exercise caution in 
using strategy consultants that seek to import templates from the business sector with 
little adaptation to the NGO context.  
 
 24 
REFERENCES 
Ahrens, T., and C.S. Chapman (2006). ‘Doing qualitative research in management 
accounting: positioning data to contribute theory’, Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 819–841. 
Ahrens, T., and J.F Dent (1998). ‘Accounting and organizations: realizing the richness 
of field research’, Journal of Management Accounting Research, 10, 1-39. 
Alac, M. and E. Hutchins (2004). ‘I see what you are saying: action as cognition in 
fMRI brain mapping practice’, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 4(3), 629-662. 
Bebbington, A., Hickey, S., and D.C. Mitlin. (2008). Can NGOs Make a Difference? 
The Challenge of Development Alternatives. London: Zed Books. 
Bebbington, A., Lewis, D., Batterbury, S., Olson, E. and S. Siddiqi. (2007). ‘Of texts 
and practices: empowerment and organisational cultures in World Bank-funded 
rural development programmes’, Journal of Development Studies, 43(4), 597-621. 
Bird, D. (1998). Never the same again: A history of VSO. Cambridge: Lutterworth 
Press. 
Chenhall, R.H., Hall, M., and D. Smith (2013). ‘Performance measurement, modes of 
evaluation and the development of compromising accounts’, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 38(4), 268-287.  
Chenhall, R.H., Hall, M., and D. Smith (2015). ‘The expressive role of performance 
measurement systems: a field study of a mental health development project’, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, in press.  
Collier, P.M. (2008). ‘Stakeholder accountability: a field study of the implementation of 
a governance improvement plan’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
21(7), 933-954. 
Cooke, B. (2008). ‘Participatory management as colonial administration’, In Dar, S. and 
B. Cooke. The New Development Management, Zed Books: London, 111-128. 
Crewe, E. and E. Harrison (1998). Whose Development? An Ethnography of Aid. Zed 
Books, London. 
Dart, R. (2004). ‘Being “business-like” in a nonprofit organization: a grounded and 
inductive typology’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33, 290-310. 
Denis, J-L., Langley, A., and L. Rouleau (2007). ‘Strategising in pluralistic contexts: 
rethinking theoretical frames’, Human Relations 60(1), 179-215. 
Ebrahim, A. (2003). ‘Accountability in practice: mechanisms for NGOs’, World 
Development, 31, 813-829. 
Edwards, M. and A. Fowler. (2002). ‘Introduction: Changing challenges for NGDO 
management’, In Edwards, M. and Fowler, A. The Earthscan Reader on NGO 
Management, Earthscan: London, 1-12. 
Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Ferguson, J. (1994). The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Fowler, A. (2002). ‘Organizing non-profits for development’, In Edwards, M. and 
Fowler, A. The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management, Earthscan: London, 74-
85. 
Glaser, B.G. and A. Strauss (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine. 
 25 
Greenspan, I. (2014). ‘How can Bourdieu’s theory of capital benefit the understanding 
of advocacy NGOs? Theoretical framework and empirical illustration’, Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 43(1), 99-120. 
Harris, M.E. (2014). ‘Organizational challenges of community associations: applying 
non-profit research to real-world problems’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly. In press; DOI: 10.1177/0899764014533996. 
Harris, M. (2011). ‘Strategic planning in an international nongovernmental development 
organization: The creation of a meta-identity’, Administration and Society 43, 
216-247. 
Harris, M., Dopson, S. and R. Fitzpatrick. (2009). ‘Strategic drift in international non-
governmental development organizations-putting strategy in the background of 
organizational change’, Public Administration and Development, 29, 415-428. 
Helmig, B., Jegers, M., and I. Lapsley (2004). ‘Challenges in managing nonprofit 
organizations: a research overview’, Voluntas 15, 101-116. 
Hopgood, S. (2006). Keepers of the flame: Understanding Amnesty International. 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Hyndman, N., and P. McDonnell (2009). ‘Governance and charities: an exploration of 
key themes and the development of a research agenda’, Financial Accountability 
and Management, 25, 5-31.  
Jager, U., and T. Beyes (2010). ‘Strategising in NPOs: a case study on the practice of 
organizational change between social mission and economic rationale’, Voluntas 
21, 82-100. 
Jegers, M. and I. Laplsey. (2001). ‘Making sense of non-profit organisations’, Financial 
Accountability and Management, 17(1), 1-3. 
Jegers, M. and I. Laplsey. (2003). ‘The 21st century challenge: managing charitable 
entities as business enterprises’, Financial Accountability and Management, 
19(3), 205-207. 
Lewis, D. (2007). The Management of Non-governmental Development Organisations. 
2
nd
 Edition. London: Routledge. 
Lewis, D. and N. Kanji (2009). Non-Governmental Organizations and Development. 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
Lewis, D. and P. Opoku-Mensah (2006). ‘Moving forward research agendas on 
international NGOs: Theory, agency and context’, Journal of International 
Development, 18, 665-675. 
Lind, E.A. and T.R. Tyler (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New 
York: Springer. 
McCourt, W. and N. Gulrajani (2010). ‘The future of development management: 
introduction to the special issue’, Public Administration and Development, 30, 81-
90. 
Mikkelsen, E.N. (2013). ‘An analysis of the social meanings of conflict in nonprofit 
organizations’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(5), 923-941. 
Molenaers, N., Dewachter, S. and S. Dellapiane. (2011). ‘Moving into the new AID 
approach, dilemmas for NGOs: the Belgian case’, Public Administration and 
Development, 31(3), 188-204. 
Morrison, J.B., and P. Salipante (2007). ‘Governance for broadened accountability: 
blending deliberate and emergent strategising’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 36(2), 195-217. 
 26 
Mowles, C. (2010). ‘Post-foundational development management-power, politics and 
complexity’, Public Administration and Development, 30, 149-158. 
Myers, J., and R. Sacks. (2003). ‘Tools, techniques and tightropes: the art of walking 
and talking private sector management in non-profit organisations, is it just a 
question of balance?’, Financial Accountability and Management, 19(3), 287-305 
Parker, L.D. (2003). ‘Financial management strategy in a community welfare 
organization: a boardroom perspective’, Financial Accountability and 
Management, 19(4), 341-374. 
Parker, L.D. (2007a). ‘Boardroom strategising in professional associations: processual 
and institutional perspectives’, Journal of Management Studies, 44, 1454-1480. 
Parker, L.D. (2007b). ‘Internal governance in the nonprofit boardroom: a participant 
observer study’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 923-934 
Parker, L.D. (2008). ‘Boardroom operational and financial control: an insider view’, 
British Journal of Management, 19, 65-88. 
Parsons, E., and A. Broadbridge (2004). ‘Managing change in nonprofit organizations: 
insights from the UK charity retail sector’, Voluntas 15, 227-242. 
Riddell, R.C. (2007). Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
Schiller, S. and M. Almog-Bar (2013). ‘Revisiting collaborations between nonprofits 
and businesses: an NPO-centric view and typology’, Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 42(5), 942-962. 
Thomas, A. (1996). ‘What is development management?’, Journal of International 
Development, 8(1), 95-110. 
Townsend, J.G., Porter, G. and E. Mawdsley. (2002). ‘The role of the transnational 
community of non-government organizations: governance or poverty reduction?’, 
Journal of International Development, 14, 829-839. 
Verkoren, W. (2010). ‘Learning by southern peace NGOs’, Journal of Development 
Studies, 46(4), 790-810. 
Wallace, T., Crowther, S. and A. Shepherd (1997). Standardising Development: 
Influences on UK NGOs’ Policies and Procedures. WorldView Publishing, 
Oxford.  
Wallace, T., Bornstein, L. and J. Chapman (2007). The Aid Chain: Coercion and 
Commitment in Development NGOs. Practical Action Publishing: Rugby, UK. 
 
 27 
Figure 1 
Timeline of strategic review process 
 
February 2009  Strategic Review commissioned by VSO Board  
 
April 2009 Consultation with 14 external organisations and an initial 
internal consultation with staff and volunteers 
 
Staff survey and initiation of the Online Community where 
staff were invited to have their say on the strategic review by 
posting comments 
 
June 2009  Mobilisation document published, setting out the scope and 
process for the strategic review.  
 
Establishment of six working groups, with each group to 
address one of the six big questions outlined in the 
mobilisation document.  
 
Each working group is responsible for the production of 
Green, White and then Pink papers as the review progresses.  
 
July 2009 Strategy Summit 1 in London involving staff from working 
groups, resulting in production of Green and then White 
papers.  
 
August 2009 Working group leaders present White papers to senior 
management team for feedback.  
 
Feedback on White papers collected from 18 reference groups.  
 
July – September 
2009 
 
Feedback on White papers collected from 33 country offices.  
 
October 2009  Strategy Summit 2 in London involving staff from working 
groups, resulting in production of Pink papers for each 
working group.  
  
November 2009  
 
Working Group leaders meet with senior management team 
and produce an integrated Blue Paper. The Blue paper was 
effectively the first draft of VSO’s new strategic plan, 
amalgamating the options chosen by each of the six working 
groups in the Pink papers into a single document. 
 
Feedback on Blue Paper collected from 18 reference groups. 
 
December 2009  Revised Blue paper issued 
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January 2010  VSO Board approves the new strategic plan ‘People First.’ 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1
 The six development goals in Focus for Change were health, education, secure livelihoods, HIV/AIDS, 
disability, and participation and governance 
2
 See www.vso.org.uk/sites/vso_uk/files/documents/What%20we%20do/people-first-strategy-2010.pdf 
(accessed 29 October 2013) for a copy of the ‘People First’ strategy document. 
3
 Working Group 3, White Paper. 
4
 Working Group 3, White Paper. 
5
 DFID (2009): Eliminating world poverty: building our common future (pp. 108, 129). 
6
 West Africa reference group feedback on Blue Paper 1. 
7
 Blue Paper 2 document. 
8
 South-east Asia, Southern Africa and West Africa reference groups feedback on Blue Paper 1. 
9
 Strategic Review Learning document. 
10
 Strategic Review Learning document. 
11
 Strategic Review Learning document. 
12
 The Strategic Review Learning document stated that the mobilisation document “has been heavily 
criticised particularly on it’s use of language, which many people thought was too complicated, too 
business like and would alienated [sic] staff members”. 
13
 Mobilisation document. 
14
 South-east Asia Reference Group, Feedback on Mobilisation document. 
15
 Blue Paper 1 document. 
16
 Strategic Review Learning document. 
